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75 allegation found at Section 15-1504(c)(9) satisfies a plaintiff 's obligation to plead it has performed a condition precedent in giving a notice of default or a notice declaring the indebtedness due and payable. Id. at ¶22. Rule 133(c) states as follows: "[i]n pleading the performance of a condition precedent in a contract, it is sufficient to allege generally that the party performed all the conditions on his part; if the allegation be denied, the facts must be alleged in connection with the denial showing wherein there was a failure to perform. Il. Sup. Ct. R. 133(c). Because the borrowers denied the deemed allegation, the court held that "[a]s such, defendants have forfeited this issue; indeed, their general denial stands as an admission that Bank of New York provided all proper notices." Id. at ¶22. Recognizing that the result might be seen as "unduly harsh," the court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the importance of its Court Rules. Id. at ¶24. "e rules of court we have promulgated are not aspirational. ey have the force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written." Id., citing Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 4010 (1995). More recently, the Second Appellate District followed suit in U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Reinish, 2020 IL App (2d) 190175. In Reinish, the court cited to the Wojcik opinion and followed its reasoning, providing lenders with cases pending in the Second Appellate District with important precedential authority in litigating this issue. In Reinish, the borrower did not address the deemed allegations of the plaintiff 's complaint in her answer, either through denying same or raising an affirmative defense contesting the sufficiency of the notice. Id. at ¶15. After finding that the borrower had forfeited her challenge to the sufficiency of the demand letter, the Reinish court provided guidance on how to interpret a mortgage, which is a contract between the parties. e court emphasized that "[i]f a term that is undefined by the contract has a plain and ordinary meaning, the terms should be enforced as written." Id. at ¶22. e court further stated that "[s]ince words derive their meaning from context, the provisions of a contract must be looked at as a whole." Id. e mortgage at issue in Reinish was not a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument but rather a different form, and the court was called upon to interpret whether the mortgage required a notice of default in the event of a failure to make payments. Id. at ¶¶22-23. To the extent that the Reinish opinion calls for giving mortgage terms their plain and ordinary meaning, and for review of the provisions of the mortgage as a whole, this case can be used not only to defend the sufficiency of notices of default but also other requirements of the mortgage. Lenders needs to be diligent in ensuring that their notices of default comply with an array of mortgage forms. However, recent Illinois case law provides a powerful argument that borrowers can waive their ability to contest the sufficiency of such notices. Julie DeJong is an Associate Attorney with Codilis & Associates, where she has worked since 2013. She has been licensed in the State of Illinois since 2007 and has been handling mortgage foreclosure litigation for over 10 years. A Michigan native, she received her B.A. in history from the University of Michigan and her J.D. from Michigan State University College of Law. She currently lives in a suburb of Chicago with her husband and daughter.

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